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Marie Chris B. Ramoya
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Quezon City
This paper attempts to elucidate on Jacques Derrida’s concept of
deconstruction and its difficult elements, viz., differance, dissemination,
destinerrance, and geocatasthrophe. These basic ideas need elaboration
for their proper understanding. Once successfully achieved, then here lies
the significance of this paper.

INTRODUCTION
Deconstruction is founded on the position that there is nothing that does not
function as a text, that is, there is nothing within man’s experience that is not subject to
textuality and hence to interpretation (Smith 2005, 44). Among other things, this points
to the fundamentality of textuality, which is constitutive of philosophy itself, for
“[w]hatever else philosophy regards itself as being (scientific, hermeneutic, analytic,
deconstructive), it is a text. It is written, or spoken, and it is read” (Ferrel 1993, 122).
This claim to the inescapable textuality of philosophy (and thought in general) is a
reaction against what Jacques Derrida (1978, 281) calls the metaphysics of presence or
logocentrism, or what he holds to be Western philosophy’s paradoxical presupposition
of a stable, selfsame, simple presence, or being at the heart—end and beginning of
thought. These presupposed entities occur as “fundamentals to principles or to the
center [and] have always designated an invariable presence—eidos, arche, telos,
energia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), aletheia, transcendality,
consciousness, God, man…,” which express logocentrism’s longing for presence at the
center of thought. Moreover, this logocentrism generates a hierarchized system of
opposites, and the superior term in these opposites serve to establish their status and
thus make the others inferior—for instance, being vs. nothingness, presence vs. absence,
immediacy vs. distance, identity vs. difference, speech vs. writing (Derrida 1976, xviii).
The superior terms—being, presence, immediacy, identity, speech—are traditionally
favored over their counterparts.
However, in criticizing the metaphysics of presence’s either/or logic, Derrida
does not favor a logical reversal. Instead, in his critical analysis, these polarities are
shown to be constituted by an already existing difference.
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Derrida attacks this logocentric thinking by pointing out certain contradictions
within it. However, [he] shows that this authenticity, this purity of self-identity
is always questionable: it is always contaminated by what it tries to exclude. No
identity is ever complete or pure: it is constituted by that which threatens it.
Derrida does not want to deny self-identity or presence: he merely wants to
show that this presence is never as pure as it claims to be. It is always open to
the other and contaminated by it. (Newman 2001, 2)
As such, deconstruction holds that any form of discourse and the development of
arguments and systems, even the most successful ones, are haunted by nonlogical
contradictions and discursive inequalities (Gasche 1987, 4), that is to say, paradoxically
and, more importantly, necessarily (Bennington and Derrida 1993, 38), deconstruction
“cannot work entirely within the structures of logocentric philosophy; neither can it
work completely outside it” (Newman 2001, 10-11). This is because philosophy has
always instituted a center (being or meaning, put briefly), the establishment of which is
always grounded on the simultaneous expense of a margin or a periphery, which in turn
destabilizes the desire for presence even before it has begun (Chapman and Routledge
2005, 70). Deconstruction, thus, moves by exposing these centers as always already
contaminated by a loss of presence at the same moment that presence is instituted,
making centers and peripheries into nonmonolithic categories of selfsameness but of
originary traces.
In so doing, it involves a double-gesture: both overturning and displacing a
conceptual order in order to both expose and wrench open the space always already
inhabited by the manifold heterogeneity of textuality (Derrida 1982a, 329). However,
three clarifications must immediately follow from this description. First, deconstruction
is not a method, much less one that proceeds from without.1 Rather, it inhabits those
very structures of thought and uses the very same tools derived from these structures,
out of which the “warring forces of signification” are carefully teased (Derrida 1981a,
xiv). It, thus, problematizes both tool and content in the same stroke. As such, second,
deconstruction “falls prey to its own work” (Derrida 1976, 24) for as the following
illustrations would show, deconstruction is, putting it quite mildly, an exercise in
recursivity. Lastly, that it is recursive does not mean it is an absolutely unruly
hermeneutics with neither origin nor departure.
That is, though Derrida denies the absolute justification for a point of departure,
“working within the need for some kind of point of departure—not one based on an
essential identity—but rather one constructed through the logic of supplementarity,
and based on its own contaminatedness” (Newman 2001, 11), deconstruction opens up
the discourse of metaphysics to an alterity, in that it reacts to the closure of metaphysics.
The result of Derrida’s analyses, then, is a radical displacement of presence as immediacy.
This, in turn, is implicative of a more general thematic, that of alterity, which can be seen
in Derrida’s focus on differences and which metaphysics tries to efface but are necessary
(and inevitable) for any system. As such, it is a move to “dismantle in order to reconstitute
what is always already inscribed” (Derrida 1976, lxxvii) and, thus, reminds one of the
always already there, which is constituted by nonidentity.
This paper will follow Derrida’s deconstruction of three instituted logocentrisms:
first, in language; second, in communication—fields in which he exposes logocentrism
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as taking the form of phonocentrism and its implications; and third, in experience—in
which he exposes logocentrism as a sort of scripted destination, so as to make the
application of deconstruction clearer.
ON LANGUAGE: DIFFERANCE
Context: Saussurean Semiotics and Husserlian Phenomenology
Basing on Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist semiotics and Edmund Husserl’s
phenomenology, Derrida asserts that any linguistic sign or any phenomenological object
is not derivative of a presence before representation. Tracing the distinction between
speech and writing and the ubiquitous privileging of the former over the latter from
Plato to Hegel (Palmer 2001, 379), Derrida deconstructs the logocentric tradition by
turning his gaze specifically to Saussure’s linguistics and the latter’s distinction between
the signified and the signifier. Derrida offers that the very concept of the sign itself is a
testament to an already existing difference present in a system the center of which is an
instituted presence, in this case, that of meaning. “Not only does Derrida” (Bennington
1993, 24) “begin with the sign in the order of his published work, [but] he asserts, from
the beginning, that the sign is at the beginning.”
In Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiotics, and in semiotics in general, a sign is
composed of two things: the signifier is the phoneme (or phone: spoken word) or
grapheme (or gramme: written word) that refers to the signified, which is the ideal or
conceptual meaning. Moreover, as the oft-quoted Saussurean claim states, “language
is both arbitrary and differential.” This means two things: one, a sign functions only
insofar as it is not any other sign in the system itself, and it is in this differential
functioning that a sign is said to have its identity; and two, the relationship between the
signified and the signifier is arbitrary.
The logocentrism that occurs in semiology is the purity of presence (which takes
the form of meaning) manifested as the immediacy present in the spoken word. Thus,
according to this schematic structure, the gramme becomes secondary, echoing the
hierarchical binary opposition between speech and writing in general.
In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined
strictly as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as thing. All signifiers, and
first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative with regard to what
would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified
sense, indeed, to the thing itself… The written signifier is always technical
and representative… This derivation is the very origin of the notion of the
“signifier.” The notion of the sign always implies within itself the distinction
between signifier and signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are
indistinguishable simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. This
notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also
a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being…. (Derrida 1976, 11)
As such, in semiology the logocentrism of Western thought takes the form of a
phonocentrism: “Speech has always been taken as more important than writing because,
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traditionally, it is assumed that speech came first and that writing is just the transcription
of speech” (Kolak 2001, 551) and speech is “believed to be uncontaminated by the
effects of textuality” (Chapman and Routledge 2005, 69). Writing is therefore understood
in the narrow sense (i.e., writing as the script, or the inscription, of speech). However,
the differences present between the two aspects of the sign itself, i.e., the signifier and
the signified, are already symptomatic of the irreducible differences haunting all systems
whose concepts are built upon logocentric metaphysics. Though Saussure himself
says that the sign’s aspects are those of “one and the same leaf,” the thesis concerning
the arbitrariness and differential referentiality of the sign itself forbids any such
hierarchical relegation of speech subordinating writing to a secondary status in terms
2
of immediacy to presence. That is, the arbitrary character of the sign, the word [as
“(mot)…[is] already a unity of sense and sound, of concept and voice…of the signified
and the signifier” (Derrida 1976, 31). It has no natural link or relationship (Saussure
1959, xxxix) with anything in reality, or with meanings, insofar as meanings are believed
to “exist in their pristine purity” (Chapman and Routledge 2005, 69). Therefore, though
Saussure holds that “writing and language are two distinct systems of signs,” writing
cannot be the “natural image” of language itself. “Simply, it has no ‘natural attachment’
to the signified within reality” (Derrida 1976, 46). Thus, the sign is always unmotivated
(or “immotivated”); the sign is arbitrarily related to its concept, and language therefore
is not—can not be—naturally represented by writing, i.e., the sign has no natural
relation to the outside (or to a pure, transcendental signified). If this is so, then the sign
functions only insofar as it is related to other signs within the system of language, and
not by its relation to anything outside this system. Derrida pushed this further and
stated “the thing itself is a sign” (Derrida 1976, 49), which should be understood as
there is no thing in itself given that the signifier and the signified are a “two-sided
unity” (Derrida 1981b, 18).
Not content with merely appealing to arbitrariness, Derrida furthers that since
differences are themselves not sensible presences, phonetic and graphic differences
themselves have no rigor in terms of their distinction, in the same way that there is no
reason for the attributing naturality to the phoneme and secondarity to the grapheme.
It is in Saussure that he finds the “desubstantializing of both the signified content and
the ‘expressive substance’” by denying the essence of language to be phonic.
“[Saussure] must now exclude the very thing which had permitted him to exclude
writing: sound and its ‘natural bond’ with meaning” (Derrida 1976, 53). This doublestandard for inclusion and, thence, exclusion is present within the history of
metaphysics. For instance, in terms of the two senses of writing as traditionally held,
i.e., one divine and one corrupting, Derrida’s concept of the pharmakon (following
Plato) has relevance to understanding writing in the sense that Derrida proposes (and
it is also the thematic which is reminiscent of his sous rature). As Hugh J. Silverman
(1994, 186) says:
Differance is also the pharmakon: neither a poison nor a remedy, neither
what kills nor what cures it is a medicine that could produce either result:
too much could be fatal, whereas the right amount could cure. Writing is a
pharmakon. Too much can make us forget, lose all the need to keep in
memory; too little and we cannot hold it all in memory.
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Again, this is relevant to the logic of the supplement that writing, in its two
senses, that is, as writing in the narrow sense, (1) “introduces” the contamination of
signification, i.e., a “disruption” of full presence via the mediating action of the sign,
and that, as the secondariness of writing to speech, (2) it is in the same movement of
expatriation and effacement (of the trace of alterity in identity and in temporality, i.e., in
difference and in deferment). Derrida (1981a, 149), in tracing philosophy’s treatment of
writing, particularly from those of Socrates and Plato, remarks:
While presenting writing as a false brother—traitor, infidel, simulacrum—
Socrates is for the first time led to envision the brother of this brother, the
legitimate one, as another sort of writing: not merely as knowing, living,
animate discourse, but as an inscription of truth in the soul. It is no doubt
usually assumed that what we are dealing with here is a “metaphor”…a
“metaphor” philosophy will never thereafter be able to do without, however
uncritical its treatment might be. But it is not any less remarkable here that
the so-called living discourse should be described by a “metaphor” borrowed
from the order of the very thing one is trying to exclude from it… Yet this
borrowing is rendered necessary by that which structurally links the
intelligible to its repetition in the copy….
In other words, from Plato to Hegel, good writing has been opposed to bad writing,
“and the good one can be designated only through the metaphor of the bad one”
(Derrida 1981a, 149).
Good writing is held to be the universal, intelligible writing, as opposed to writing
in the literal, sensible, finite inscription. This echoes Derrida’s critical reading of the
Husserlian condition for ideality. If “the ‘literal ’ meaning of writing [is] metaphoricity
itself” (Derrida 1976, 15), following Derrida’s rigorous and intricate argument for writing
as arche-writing, that is, if language is characterized and conditioned by arche-writing,
then it follows that metaphoricity is implicative of language itself.
For if “[t]he exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing in general…[then]
[w]ithout that exteriority, the very idea of the sign falls into decay” (Derrida 1976, 14), and
if writing, being considered as “sensible matter and artificial exteriority: a clothing…an
‘image’ and exterior figuration” (Derrida1976, 35), then it has been paradoxically understood
throughout philosophy as both natural (universal, intelligible, primary) and artificial (literal,
sensible, fallen). If writing as “a sign signifying a signifier which itself signifies an eternal
verity,” that is, “eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos” (Derrida
1976, 15), then taking into consideration Aristotle’s formulation and its variants, i.e., writing
as the representation of a representation, it therefore does not come to merely represent
(or befall) an innocent, pure language (such as speech was believed to be), one that is
bereft of the contamination of signification. Moreover, appealing to the simple signifieds
supposedly represented by writing exposes an unending string of signifiers, and not “the
realm of ultimate meanings” (Derrida 1976, 43) for, as stated, there is no ultimate meaning
that does not pass through representation.
The hierarchized opposition “speech over writing” also becomes more apparent
in Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness. Though the parallelisms between
structuralist linguistics and Husserlian phenomenology should not be exaggerated as
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simple and identical, Derrida analyzes several points in Husserl’s phenomenology and
the structures therein and concludes that logocentrism, too, is present in
phenomenology. Two interrelated points in Husserlian phenomenology will be presented.
First, in the context of his analysis of consciousness, particularly in terms of selfcommunication and inner-time consciousness and, second, in terms of authentic ideality
via repetition.
Generally, Derrida’s critique is grounded on phenomenology as a philosophical
movement “seeking to define ‘essences’” (Chapman and Routledge 2005, 136); its search
for the relationship between (and condition of possibility of) objective, ideal structures
and subjective ones via the concepts of intentionality (Husserl 1965) and reduction
(Husserl 1964). In terms of establishing the possibility of the relationship between objective
structures, e.g., the essence of geometry and the concepts therein, and subjective
structures, i.e., the ego, consciousness, Husserl (1964) comes to a pertinent problematic.
It is ultimately in the analysis of Husserl’s presentation of subjectivity and consciousness
which Derrida notes the apparent torture haunting the Husserlian system: precisely that
of the presence of a (non)originary difference even (and already) in Husserl’s pure
experience (Gasche 1987, 7-8). Furthermore, this privileging of the voice occurs in (and,
hence, is contested by) Derrida in two forms (the literal and the figurative voice), which
grounds both analyses and supports the same conclusion and charge—logocentrism as
phonocentrism of the West. In Rudolf Bernet (1993, 146-47), the literal voice is the spoken
word, immaterial and completely animated by its transcendental meaning, nonindicative
and purely expressive when the speaker hears himself speak; the figurative voice is the
metaphor for all forms of pure auto-affection. “If, however, there exists no such pure selfaffection, then instantaneous self-consciousness is not only affected by blindness (“the
blink of an eye”) but also by muteness (“the voice that keeps silence”).”
To clarify his charges, first, Derrida (see Smith 2005, 28-31) turns his attention
towards Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of consciousness, and its truism of the
primacy of speech, exemplified in soliloquy. Husserl writes, “Why is the phoneme the
most ‘ideal’ of signs?… When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence of
this operation that I hear myself at the same time that I speak… As pure auto-affection…
3
[t]his [act] is no doubt the possibility for what is called subjectivity.” Speech, therefore,
is valued over writing, and self-communication (“interior monologue,” soliloquy, or
“auto-affection”) is ostensibly the most pure form of a speech act, in terms of the
absolute proximity of voice and being. Pure expression or expressivity, i.e., meaning, is
held by Husserl as essentially non-indicative expression, “indication” referring to
“pointers which stand for something else,” i.e., as sign—hence, whatever indicates
implies absence.
Derrida contends that Husserl, in privileging meaning as non-indicated presence,
has to exclude signification altogether, in that Derrida (1987, 112) reads Husserl as
saying that it is only in “prelinguistic self-presence” that meaning lies.
In a brief but detailed explanation in the attempt to contextualize Derrida’s analysis,
Bennington and Derrida (1993, 64-66) devotes a section to Husserl himself:
According to Husserl, there are two sorts of signs: indications and
expressions. Indications are all caught up in a facticity which compromises
their ideality and forbids all certainty…Indications may say something, but
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not mean to say anything, have no meaning in that sense. In interlocution
too, my words, which attempt to express my intentions or my meaning, only
indicate them to the other party, represent what is properly present to myself
alone, must go outside to facticity and the physical side of the sign. This
indication cannot be the essence of signification, for I can also speak to
myself, indicating nothing, not going outside to communicate my thought,
without for all that losing meaning.... In its purity, expression expresses
itself in the self-presence of consciousness….
Hence, there is a “possibility of bracketing the sign character of words by merely
representing words” in Husserl (Gasche 1993, 8). Moreover, “It is not by chance that
the thought of being, as the thought of this transcendental signified, is manifested
above all in the voice: in a language of words [mots]” for Derrida (1976, 20) and for
Graham Priest (1994, 104) in the “primum signatum,” and hence, “[i]n a nutshell, a
presence is…a kind of non-linguistic entity which serves to provide a determiner of
sense; Derrida often calls it the transcendental signified.” In Husserl (see Bennington
and Derrida 1993, 66-69), the version of this transcendental signified as the pure selfsame
presence synthesized by the transcendental ego.
However, if there is no indication (as representation) in expression, then no
signification is possible. The purity of hearing oneself speaks the moment one speaks
crumbles due to the significatory and contaminating (i.e., intervening) process necessary
even for soliloquy. This is because there is an inevitability to the signifying action of
expression itself, in terms of it being implicative of an other, or an absence of selfsameness:
“...contrary to Husserl’s notion of a pre-linguistic, ‘pure’ consciousness, Derrida points to
what we might call the semiotic conditioning of consciousness: thought does not proceed
without language” (Smith 2005, 37) . The communality of language conditions the alterity
already present within any expressivity in soliloquy, and in communication in general.
Though Husserl (see Derrida 1973a, 45) posits that there is “an absolute heterogeneity
between perception or primordial presentation and re-presentation or representative reproduction.” Derrida reads Husserl as separating these two movements by an abyss
(Gasche 1993, 15); thus, leading the former to conclude that the latter’s transcendental
phenomenology has in itself an element of alterity already within its own system.
...phenomenology’s transcendental Schein [appearance] results in three
paradoxes, all of which revolve around language. [First], after having
performed the reduction, the phenomenologist finds it impossible to
communicate his knowledge to those still stuck in the natural attitude….
[Second], the phenomenologist has no other language at his disposal than
mundane language…. Finally, when the phenomenologist tries to determine
the relation between the transcendental ego and the empirical ego, the
absolute and the world, he has at his disposal only mundane logics; the
ontic identity determined by these logics, however, is inadequate for
determining this identity which is also a difference….
In light of this intersubjective problem, a transcendental language
must be developed… If it is indeed the case that, for the theorizing ego, the
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transcendental meanings are “transparent” prior to communication, then it
seems that, if one is going to develop a transcendental language, one will
have to develop a language equally transparent. This language, therefore,
would have to be a voice, a perfect unity of signified and signifier. (Lawlor
1993, 81)
The voice, far from being “an ether that introduces no absence, no distortion, no
alterity; the voice is…entirely safe” (Lawlor 1993, 84). Derrida grants the transcendental
experience synthesized by the transcendental ego as always already caught up in a
system of indication, even, and perhaps most especially, in soliloquy.
Moreover, and further using Husserl to disrupt phenomenology, Derrida uses
ideality as implied by objectivity and inner-time consciousness to problematize pure
presence. Objectivity is of prime importance both to Husserl and to Derrida, albeit for
obviously different reasons and contentions. For Husserl (see Derrida 1973a, 7),
authentic ideality must be one that can be infinitely repeated or iterable in the identity
of its presence: “[I]ntersubjectivity is the condition for objectivity, which is absolute
only in the case of ideal objects.” This is also where the Derridean analysis of innertime consciousness becomes pertinent, as already implied even from his reading of
Husserl in the latter’s concept. Husserl posits “transcendental appearance” in the
context of time, particularly of the “Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart)”—a saturated,
pregnant presence that is a synthesis of protention (the expectation of the same) and
retention (primary memory), by the agency of the transcendental ego (Caputo 1987,
101). Derrida utilizes these same concepts and pushes them to their conclusion: the
perception of a now, a present, is dependent upon that which is not present, in terms of
temporality (Derrida 1973a, 64). That is to say, if the ideality of perception only becomes
authentic by repetition (and, hence, repeatability), then at the ground of the possibility
of ideality itself is not an originary presentation (in Husserlian parlance, Gegewartigung)
but that which has a representative structure. In terms of experiencing a now that is
pregnant with presence, that very presentation itself already carries within itself the
necessary possibility for repetition (and necessary for its own ideality, as far as Derrida
reads Husserl), which is a representation (Vergegenwartigung), a modification, an
essentially constituted present the presencing of which “can appear as such only
inasmuch as it is continuously compounded (compose continument) with a nonpresence
and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation.” Furthermore:
The original phenomenological data that Husserl wants to respect lead him
to posit an absolute heterogeneity between perception…and re-presentation…
Memory, images, and signs are re-presentations in this sense. Properly
speaking, Husserl is not led to recognize this heterogeneity, for it is this which
constitutes the very possibility of phenomenology. For phenomenology can
only make sense if a pure and primordial presentation is possible and given in
the original. This distinction [implies] re-presentation, which posits the havingbeen-present in memory…. (Derrida 1973a, 45)
As such, the present is the present only because there is an always already
synthesized protential-retentional (expectation-remembrance) making present again, i.e.,
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the Living Present is contaminated (i.e., woven) with representation and makes it possible
due to the very same Husserlian requirement of the continuous compounding of the
now. Therefore, in terms of the constituted ideality which grounds the whole
transcendental phenomenological project, “[t]he crux of Derrida’s argument consists
then in demonstrating that Husserl’s own description of the movement of temporality
and the constitution of intersubjectivity unmistakably establish repetition, and with it
everything that ought to derive from presence, to be required by presence and all ideal
objectivity in general” (Gasche 1993, 11). As Gayatri Spivak (see Derrida 1976, lxviii)
notes, “Husserl’s text is tortured by a suppressed insight that the Living Present is
always already inhabited by difference.” If ideality is constituted by intersubjectivity,
then the synthesized protentive-retentive character of the Living Present requires a
repeatability which is only accessed through writing (Lawlor 1993, 85). The opposition
between speech and writing then becomes a superfluous distinction, in that what makes
ideality and objectivity possible and present in the system itself has been expatriated
from itself, (paradoxically) notwithstanding Husserl’s positing of language as the only
ground of possibility which makes ideality (the purest of which is that of geometry)
form in consciousness (and in the temporal realm in general): to be absolutely ideal,
the object must be written, for writing alone can perdure.
Repetition occurs as the constitutive of Husserlian ideality and in Derrida (1973a,
50) as representativite indefinie. “In a certain way ideal objects do exist objectively in
the world, but it is only in virtue of these…repetitions and ultimately in virtue of sensibly
embodying repetitions [which occur] as language” (Smith 2005, 161). It is important
also to note that
Derrida’s displacement of the Husserlian distinction between presence
and re-presentation is based on a modified account of re-presentation. For
Derrida, re-presentation involves a process of indicative signification, i.e.,
the presence of signs that must be understood as traces…. [He] must show
that the presence of ideal objects as well as the self-presence of the
transcendental subject necessarily depends on a form of re-presentation
that is characteristic of traces. As far as ideal objects are concerned, this
presents no difficulty since Husserl had himself emphasized in On the Origin
of Geometry and elsewhere the importance of writing for the constitution
and preservation of ideal objects. (Bernet 1993, 149)
To conclude, then, the subject in phenomenology, the ego, is constituted and not
constituting as such, in terms of the objects of its consciousness. Therefore, and
again, the instituted primacy of speech in the context of self-communication, as that
which does not need signs, becomes problematical. If the now of the moment in which
one speaks in an interior monologue is implicative of a now that is in itself made possible
only by a representation, speech then becomes grounded on the very thing which has
been taken to be the “downfall” of writing in the narrow sense: the signifying action of
language itself. This echoes Derrida’s conclusion relative to his analysis of Saussurean
linguistics: speech is as much contaminated by writing as writing in the narrow sense
has been instituted as. Clearly, Derrida (1976, lxix) is proposing an understanding of
writing in terms of that which makes both the oppositions of the signifier over the
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signified and that of speech over writing possible in the first place: writing as “tracestructure, [in that] everything [is] always already inhabited by the track [or trace] of
something that is not itself….”
The secondarity that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone affects
all signifiers in general, affects them always already, the moment they enter
the game. There is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured,
the play of signifying references that constitute language. (Derrida 1976, 7)
Writing in the narrow sense is already present even in speech. It does not erupt
from the outside of language (understood traditionally as speech), rather, it is always
already within the system of language. “The meaning of the outside was always present
within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside, and vice versa” (Derrida 1976, 35). In
this light, representation therefore becomes more originary than presentation, in terms
of the mediatedness which is seen in both speech and writing, or, perhaps more
accurately, in speech as writing. “Yet Husserl himself has shown that it belongs to the
very structure of the sign to operate without fulfillment, in the absence of its object”
(Caputo 1987, 104) and, therefore, the distinction between indication and expression,
seminal to Husserl’s theory of signs, “stipulates the possibility, and existence of a
‘lived experience [that] is immediately self-present in the mode of certitude and absolute
necessity” (Derrida 1973a, 58). Because of this very fact, “[d]istinct from re-presentation,
presentation, more precisely, primordial presentation, is free from the delegating or
representative function of indicative signs. Indeed, the indivisibility of the presence to
self of what is given in the mode of immediate presence assures the irreducibility of representation to presentative presentation” (Gasche 1993, 10). It is this that Derrida
deconstructs by his analysis of Husserl’s inner-time consciousness and repeatability
as the condition for ideality, leading to representation being originary through the logic
of supplementarity.
Differance
To the common root of writing and speech, Derrida assigns the name “archewriting” (“archi-ecriture”). Arche-writing consists of writing under erasure (sous rature),
involving the always already representationality of language. Another term for this is
differance, a neologism from the French differer (Latin verb differre) which means both
“to differ” (to not be identical to) and “to defer” (to delay, to take a detour). To be not
identical to something (or, since every “present” is a “representation,” to be not identical
4
to itself) in space; to delay its (re)presentation in time. The sign, therefore, can only be
understood in the context of differance, which affects the totality of the sign (which is
both, and neither simply, signified and signifier). Put simply, “[s]uch is the strange
‘being’ of the sign: half of it is always ‘not there’ and the other half always ‘not that.’
The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is
forever absent” (italics supplied; Derrida 1976, xvii). As such, the structure of the sign
is the structure of the trace, which subverts all structures inasmuch as they are built on
presences. In denying pure self-sameness in presence, Derrida (1976, xv) simultaneously
forwards the trace (the French of which “carries strong implications of track, footprint,
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imprint”), in that, “[n]othing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is
anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and
traces of traces” (Derrida 1981b, 26). The trace therefore is another name for the
(non)originary in Derrida, in focusing on the impossibility of a pure, selfsame, immediate
presence, as posited by both linguistics and phenomenology:
The unheard difference between the appearing and the
appearance…(between the “world” and “lived experience”) is the condition
of all other differences, of all other traces, and it is already a trace…. The
trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to
saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The
trace is the differance which opens appearance and signification. (Derrida
1976, 65)
In short, meaning, i.e., sense, insofar as it is conditioned by alterity in time and in
space, is automatically not being (Derrida 1981a, ix). If consciousness (and hence
signification) of presence is conditioned by trace, which is not in itself pure or
uncontaminated, the trace itself cannot be an origin as such: it is a (non)origin.
Hence, there is always already an alterity in time and in space as implied and conditioned
by the trace in contention to Husserl’s transcendental appearance. “There is a duration
to the blink, and it closes the eye” (Derrida 1973a, 65) in the same way as “A moment
cannot be qualified as just a little bit past, just a little lapsed. The present in the pregnant
sense cannot be just a little bit pregnant!… Retention and reproduction are but variant
degrees of representation….” (Caputo 1987, 102-103). All these terms— trace, differance,
arche-writing—can be understood as pertinent concepts (nicknames of one other) in
the motifs of Derrida’s reaction against “the reduction [effacement, expatriation] of
writing as the reduction of the exteriority of the signifier,” and hence are pertinent to his
grammatology. The gram (which he inscribes in his grammatology) is none other than
differance (Derrida 1981b, 26) and arche-writing is none other than the other as the
necessary condition, but dangerous, supplementarity of language that has never been
in absolute proximity to presence and meaning (Smith 2005, 42).
Playing with the double meaning of the word supplement in French, Derrida follows
Jacques Rousseau in his anthropological analysis of writing as that “dangerous
supplement.”5 Following Rousseau, supplement has two meanings which occur both at
once (as “an addition” and “a substitute”), which are intimately connected with writing,
in that “[t]the sign is always the supplement [addition and substitute] of the thing
itself” (Derrida 1976, 145). The supplement is “exterior, outside of the positivity to
which it is superadded, alien to that which, in order to be replaced by it, must be other
than it” (Derrida 1976, 145), adding itself and substituting what for Rousseau is the
pure, virginal presence of Nature. Like writing, then, which adds itself to the purity of
speech, as by transcription, it replaces the thing itself, as by signification. However, it
is in this understanding of the supplement, as arche-writing, that the economy of
signification becomes apparent: just as the sign refers indefinitely, supplementarity is
structured as a chain (“[t]he play of the supplement is indefinite” and “[r]eferences
refer to references”), in a movement that is always differed and deferred. “The thing
itself steals away” because “the thing itself is a sign,” which is another way of saying
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“there is no thing in itself” (Derrida 1976, 49). Representation, supplementarity, as was
already mentioned and demonstrated, is the originary condition of presence.
The logic of the supplement, therefore, transgresses the binary logic of logocentric
metaphysics, but also gives rise to the oppositions within it. The supplement is thus
conceived of traditionally as dangerous, fatal, in that it stands for the thing itself (which
again echoes Husserl’s paradoxical insight that what guarantees objectivity is writing,
and at the same movement, which introduces absence). Supplementarity, hence,
addresses the issue posed both by semiology and phenomenology: the mediatedness
of presence (or the present), but paradoxically, in effacing the trace, the “logocentric
longing par excellence” is to forget the originary supplementarity and institute it as
purely additive, i.e., as merely an addition to a pure presence, a pure concept, a pure
meaning, language as speech. The history of philosophy, therefore, is the history of
effacing what it has instituted but obliterated in its orbital quest for presence: the trace
of alterity in supplementarity. Derrida (1976, 149), therefore, charges logocentrism as
having one law: blindness to the supplement, which is what logocentrism in all its
permutations is. To this charge he counters arche-writing as “originary supplementarity
(if this absurd expression may be risked, totally unacceptable as it is within classical
logic)” within language, in that it is always already implicative of an alterity with regard
to presence, which is neither restored nor accessed in purity by its supplementarity. In
short, “substitution has always already begun.” Absence, risk, death, loss as implied in
speech and in writing, and “writing” as arche-writing—as “the name of the structure
always already inhabited by the trace” (Derrida 1976, xxxix)—will be made more clear in
the context of communication.
Therefore, it is in the spacing, delay, supplementarity, tracing of differences in
both time as well as space that makes the present presence possible, as signified,
mediated, contaminated, as well as conditioned by an other. There is a detour which
must and inevitably will be taken, for anything to mean. “It is presence in general that
is thus divided,” that is, through the necessary supplement of the sign, of language in
general, presence is fissured at its origin by taking the detour and spacing of originary
representation. This detour is the detour of arche-writing, of differance, which
conditions all experience, since “all experience is the experience of meaning.” The
supplementarity of writing therefore becomes the original condition for language to be
language: “the becoming-writing of language is the becoming-language of language”
(Derrida 1976, 229).
ON COMMUNICATION: DESTINERRANCE
Context: Dissemination and Iterability
For Derrida (1982a, 318-19), there is a homogenous space and a selfsame process
involved in the communication of meaning, in that meaning is “the content of the
semantic message, is thus transmitted, communicated, by different means…over a much
greater distance, but within a milieu that is fundamentally continuous and equal to itself,
within a homogenous element across which the unity and integrity of meaning is not
affected in an essential way” (Derrida 1982a, 311). The homogeneity is established
within the means as well as the capacity of the sign, in that a sign or its constituted
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statement can function either as an empty reference or as detached from its referent; a
sign can be vacuous (as with the case of mathematical meaning); a sign can be aggramatical
but still be meaningful. The sign functioning even as it is detached from its referent
constitutes the logic of iterability in Derrida (which is noticeably the structure of repetition
also in his argument against Husserl). The sign and/or statement being thus detached,
he comes to two interrelated points relevant to the section, which will be discussed in
turn: iterability conditions communication, and anything that is sent is not so much
totalizable in terms of context as well as presence as it is disseminated. By the same
gesture as the logic of supplementarity was presented as the (non)originary condition
of the sign, the logic of iterability becomes the condition for communication. Iterability
(as a shorthand definition, repeatability) is implicative of absence, in the forms of
detachment, dissemination—briefly defined, meaning and/or presence undergoing
irreducible and generative multiplicity, and of death (Derrida 1981b, 45).
First, iterability (the exemplar of which are infinitely reusable and recombinable
letters having a common form) (Lawlor 1998, 188), is necessary for the sign to be a
sign—an intelligible trace which cannot and can no longer be conceived as proper or
unique. As such, “the structure of iteration…implies both identity and difference….
The iterability of an element divides its own entity a priori…. It is because this iterability
splits each element while constituting it…that the remainder…is never a full or fulfilling
presence” (Derrida 1988, 53).
As such, iterability implies absence as was stated, but it further conditions
6
sendings (envois ) of any kind. A statement’s detachability, in the case of Husserl’s
analysis of signs, being detached from their referent, indicates its functioning even as
it is wrenched from its “original” utterance or inscription (this detachability having
been presented to be what makes the sign what it is in the first place). Iterability and
detachability, therefore, are two aspects of any sign, of any statement, of any text—
for them to be considered as such. These are implicative of the absence which haunts
both writing (in the narrow sense) and speech, no matter how it would seem otherwise,
and hence the proffering of writing as arche-writing. The possibility of functioning
when cut off from its referent is none other than the dangerous supplementarity of
arche-writing as (non)origin: the weaves of traces which are, as they are “present” in
language, “present” in communication, such that they condition language and
communication as not presentation of a meaning that is selfsame but always already
indicative of absences—in reference, as well as in the context of its inscription. Simply,
for a text to be a text, it must be iterable in citation and hence can be detached from its
context, in short, it must be quotable. In the same way that a sign that is understood
to be unique, that is, occurring only once, would not be a sign (Halion 1992, 164); a
statement that could not be cited in another context is not a statement (Bennington
and Derrida 1993, 86). However, the necessary possibility of all utterances constitute
their being grafted into other citational chains (Derrida 1982a, 315) does entail that
contexts cannot be total. However, “[j]ust because contexts are always already underdetermined does not mean that they are indeterminate” (Smith 2005, 63). Indeed, for
an indeterminate text, and for de-contextualizing to be possible, the only requisite
is that one does not even read a text, that is, in absolute respect to a text, in one
“would have to bar a reading of it…and hence no longer be a text” (Bennington and
Derrida 1993, 163).
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Second, because of the iterability and detachability of envois, communication
7
necessarily engenders the possibility of death. This, ultimately, is what the functioning
of the sign, and hence of a text, points to: that they continue to function even when the
writer and the reader are absent. Iterability and detachability, therefore, condition the
very meaning of a message, a sending, or a text.
This repetition necessarily involves the possibility of my death, and
therefore of finitude. But ideality is pure only if it allows a repetition unto
infinity: in fact we are in finitude, but de jure ideality implies infinity. This
infinite only appears in the finite:… “I am” is understood on the basis of “I
am dead.”
“I” must be able to function in the absence of its object, and, like any
other statement, “I am” must be understandable in my absence and after my
death. (Bennington and Derrida 1993, 110, 116)
In offering this, Derrida fissures both the space (which is simply not a space) and
medium [which is (non-)originary] of meaning and communication: the singularity which
marks the coordinates (i.e., the context) of the moment of inscription is itself a differeddeferred (i.e., of differance) presentation, haunted by absence, in referent; conditioned
by absence in the form of death. This singularity which marks the moment of the text’s
inscription carries with itself a fissuring a priori, it is “a presence thus divided,” like the
linguistic sign is. Hence it is always a mark: a trace of absence-presence, but never
totalizable in terms of identity, in terms of context, or of space. Derrida likens this
strange functioning to a signature: a signature is appended in terms of a proper name,
marks the here-and-now of a text, a date, a document, it must be iterable in its common
form, and thus must hold within itself the possibility of holding weight even when the
signatory is dead. Furthermore, this signature at the moment of its inscription bears
countersignatures, in that its intelligibility and readability (conditioned by its iterability)
by an other thus wounds and fissures the signature (and the text) the moment it is
written: it “loses the singularity it keeps,” it is disseminated at the very start (Derrida
1992b; Bennington and Derrida 1993, 377).
Hence, following the logic thus presented, the openness to the other as well as
to the iterability unto absolute absence as death also holds, in that one is outlived
(and should be so) by his inscribed signature, which the other countersigns by
appending his reading of the text, or, understood in terms of the postal, of the message
sent, which, for it to be a message, outlives both the addressee and the sender, ad
infinitum, to other readers and other contexts. Thus, a text is always essentially open
to further reading. For David Wood (1987, 157), “[p]erhaps, then, both the reader and
writer are engaged in a life-and-death struggle that never ends, and is never resolved.”
The other therefore is a dangerous supplement also: it is the countersigning of the
other which detaches the text (which is never a text proper to only one context—
because of iterability; nor proper to a moment of inscription—because of
countersignatures) from its context. The other is also thus the condition for the text’s
perdurance throughout space and time, all by the same movement—the movement of
arche-writing, which in this context is more specifically called dissemination [the
always already multiplicity in and conditioning singularity, or, as in Spivak (see Derrida
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1976, lxxiii) the loss of “meaning that is one”] and destinerrance (the conditioning
possibility of arrival in non-arrival).
Destinerrance
In presenting destinerrance (also, adestination), Derrida’s style becomes more
metaphorical, in all senses of the word. The concepts pertinent hereafter, while still
employed by Derrida throughout what might be called his “professional” genre, are
more performative of the contamination of philosophy by poetry, i.e., metaphoricity.
The concept of the metaphor, while being very apposite in a discussion of Derrida’s
take on language, can be further appreciated when put in the context of communication,
where the postal principle governing all envois becomes pertinent, and where Derrida’s
notion of absence and death haunting all texts (here in the form of messages) becomes
interwoven with his critical analyses of the concepts of address and destination.
8
Interestingly, Derrida notes that the “real meaning” of “metaphor” is “transport.” Thus
communication, the transporting of a message from a scriptor to an addressee, is captured
by the metaphor of metaphor, which he terms the postal principle. He (1987, 64)
inscribes his analysis within the Heideggerian es gibt, i.e., following Heidegger’s
schicken (to send) and exploiting the connections of the word with destination (to
destine), writes:
[S]chicken, is to send, envoyer, to “expedite,” to cause to leave or to
arrive, etc… [T]he gift itself is given on the basis of “something” which is
nothing, which is not something, it would be…like an “envoi,” destination,
the destinality…of an envoi which, of course, does not send this or that,
which sends nothing that is, nothing that is a “being,” a “present.” Nor to
whoever, to any addressee as an identifiable self-present subject.
For Derrida (1987, 29), the teleology governing the logocentric metaphysics gets
its support in the context of sendings in Heidegger, in that “the epochs of being would
still be derived from the envoi of being,” that is to say, again, of the orbital history
conceptualized as an origin and a telos of presence, i.e., of a destination that coincides
with its origin, in terms of its conceptualization of presence. Derrida, however, in
contextualizing this sending as destined, subjects it once again to what the postal
system (which is what makes all sendings possible) implies: “To post is to send by
‘counting’ with a halt, a relay, or a suspensive delay, the place of a mailman, the possibility
of going astray and of forgetting….” That is to say, a message, being disseminated, is
disseminated both spatially and temporally, and in multiple ways, moreover. The
homogenous space, therefore, as well as the message, are both fissured—here
disseminative and disseminated, respectively. A message, being subjected to a fallible,
disseminating postal system, is at always at the risk of the always already possibility
inherent in and condition for any mediation—loss, delay (the very characteristics of
differance itself—detouring, differing)—and when it does arrive it “takes itself away
from the arrival at arrival” (Derrida 1987, 123-24), for its chance of arriving owes itself
to possibility as possibility and therefore of impossibility. That is, for as long as the
possibility exists that the letter will not arrive, then it must do so indefinitely—
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indefinitely, that is, until it arrives, the event of which is conditioned by its never
arriving, and never arriving simply (Derrida 2001, 107). In a word, it arrives in its being
adestined.
Moreover, Derrida pushes the question of destination (which has never been in
the Derridean corpus limited to messages and texts, as it becomes more apposite to any
voyage, including the broadest voyage there is: experience itself) to a necessary
destinerrance.
ON EXPERIENCE: THE ODYSSEY AND GEOCATASTROPHE
If every travel is a traversal from somewhere to somewhere else, then it must be a
spacing which is done in a disseminative spacing and, therefore, denying the originary
and teleological character which is implicative of travel, that is, it denies an absolute
point of departure, as well as that of destination, in that it constitutes of a spacing
always already within a topos which does not assure any identity. Every encounter,
thus being deprived of originarity in terms of identity, departure, and arrival, is always
already an encounter which is implicative of catastrophe, an event of alterity.
Experience as a word is explained by Derrida (with Malabou 2004, 1, 41) as
traversal, or as voyage: both understood as relevant to the roots of the words derive
and arrive: Deriver iterally means
...to leave the bank or shore” in two contrary senses. In the first instance,
deriving can characterize a continuous and ordered trajectory from an origin
to an end…. In the second instance, however, deriving as drifting refers to
a loss of control, to deviation or skidding…. Necessity and chance thus
cohabit, in a paradoxically complicitous way, within the same verb.
Experience, therefore, contains within itself both reaching one’s destination and whatever
it is that happens, expected or otherwise.
Derrida (with Malabou 2004, 4) captures this paradox utilizing the myth of the
Odyssey. Ulysses is seen to have a long voyage, one which has an origin to an end that
is “derived in a continuous and ordered trajectory.” Anything that happens and befalls
him in this voyage is thus necessary, any catastrophe becomes an accident confirming
the essence of the voyage. In so doing, the traversal and its events become derivative,
the catastrophes are a script that is followed, therefore, no longer an accident, no longer
a surprise, and no longer befalling Ulysses. It is a “disciplined chance,” a chance that
is softened in advance, in that it is expected, anticipated, programmed. It is a surprise
known in advance; therefore, it was never a surprise to begin with.
When the impossible makes itself possible, the event takes place
(possibility of the impossible). This is, without question, the paradoxal
form of the event: if an event is only possible, in the classic sense of the
word, if it inscribes itself in the conditions of possibility, if it does no more
than make explicit, unveil, reveal, accomplish what was already possible,
then it’s no longer an event. For an event to take place, for it to be possible,
it must be, as event the coming of the impossible.
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The condition of possibility thus gives the possible a chance, but by
depriving it of its purity...im-possibility is thus not the simple contrary of the
possible. It seems opposed to it but it also gives itself over to possibility: this
impossibility traverses possibility and leaves in it the trace of its withdrawal.
An event wouldn’t be worthy of its name, it wouldn’t make anything happen,
if it did nothing but deploy, make explicit, actualize what was already possible,
that is to say, in sum, if all it did was to implement a program…. For there to be
an event, it has to be possible, of course, but there must be an exceptional,
absolutely singular interruption in the regime of possibility, the event must
not be simply possible; it must not reduce itself to explication, the unfolding,
the acting out of a possible. (Derrida 2001, 108-109)
That is, for any traversal and for every encounter to be worthy of the name, it has
to have the event of the other, i.e., the arrival of (or into) what is foreign, unexpected,
unanticipated, impossible. This is, paradoxically and precisely, what a traversal entails:
an encounter with a truly other, unexpected, not in the program, in a sense,
catastrophic. As such, any traversal always has an element of a geocatastrophic nature
to it (Bennington and Derrida 1993, 126). Like the message which owes its chance of
arrival to nonarrival, the event, for it to be an event of alterity, i.e., that which “abducts
the traveler’s identity and allows an opening to alterity to become an experience of the
world in general, must occur by surprise and remain incalculable” (Derrida and Malabou
2004, 2). Moreover, as Derrida and Malabou (2004, 197-198) explain:
The catastrophe or dangerous reversal results from a collision—which
is at the same time by chance and of necessity—between the desire for an
absolute intimacy with the other and the very impossibility of every joining
together. The other can be the loved one, the foreigner, the far-off land, a
language, an island or a city…. Such an excess of exteriority…is matched by
the fantasy of a total immobility, of a place where one can wall oneself in,
never leaving or moving…. Paralysis relates to catastrophe inasmuch as it
signals an unknotting…. When derivation is doubled and overtaken by the
speed of the postal principle, the event is freed, dissociated in its possibility
from every methodical anticipation, from every order of arrival. The voyage
takes place on the basis of this unlinking, destining the traveler to confront
both punishment and fortune, which is always the case in terms of fate or
the lottery.
From this citation it can be noted that the paralysis that immobility induces in
terms of being adestinerrant is at once neutralized, in terms of the overturning of the
logic of derivation. Thus there is no need, once assurances are deprived, in terms of
where one always already is, to grapple with chance and necessity as opposition: one
realizes that “we are the play of chance and necessity” (Derrida1976, xliv) . Futhermore,
Derrida (1992c, 118) states:
...do you seriously want to get me to speak about my “destiny” under these
conditions? No. But if by destiny one means a singular matter of not being
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free, then what interests me is especially that, precisely and everywhere:
this intersection of change [sic] and necessity, the line of life, the proper
language of life, even if it is never pure.
The traveler, wanting to be assured of an identity amidst his traversal, exposes
himself to death every which way he turns, and in the very desire of assured destination
and identity. However, the traveler can have assurance of neither destination (because
of destinerrance) or of identity (because of alterity): it “can only expose itself to accidents
when it tries to save itself, and first of all to save itself from its name and its coming. It
has no relation to itself—that is, no totalizing individuality—that does not expose it
even more to death and to being-torn apart” (Derrida 1992a, 303).
This notwithstanding, and reiterating that Derrida’s treatment of catastrophe as
end, and also a reversal (in this context the reversal of the logic of destination), Derrida
(with Malabou 2004, 28), as was stated, is not leading towards a catastrophism. Insofar as
traversal has thus been discussed, he offers in his aporia, a “faith in the other, precisely,
that must orient every voyage that remains truly open to the world.” That is to say,
though “Derrida stakes a claim for a voyage…[that] would stand in the immanence of a
catastrophe [and] travels in the twilight of that immanence, perpetually missing his
appointment with Ulysses,” he, in so doing, opens the whole discussion to possibility, and
thus to, as Genevieve Lloyd (1999, 34) puts it, a “crossroads between chance and necessity.”
Following his discussions on the possibility of events and their being conditioned
by impossibility, insofar as events (should) remain incalculable, as well as his discussion
of destinerrance and originary exile which both fissure homogenous points of origin
and departure as well as crossing borders, it becomes apparent that what is underscored
is neither assurance nor necessity as such but a “perhaps.” This “perhaps” is concordant
with the singularity of an event (which, as does the logic of derivation, should not be
assimilated into “the essence of the voyage”), and thus as openness to what one
encounters, as other and this other as singular other. This “experience of the perhaps”
is the conclusion of Derrida’s overturning of the logic of derivation, of the Odyssey.
Assured of no guarantees, and no reprogramming back into an orbital odyssey of no
surprises (as is one in one’s experiences), there is the faith in the perhaps. This is a faith
which is not prescribed nor instituted by configuring the traversal into a derived drifting.
It is a “faith on the other” which makes the voyage “truly open to the world,” in that that
faith is almost “undecidable,” and hence, his aporia:
The perhaps is just that which happens only in so far as it might just as
well not happen. The love of this future is experienced as risk, what is
expresses is not to be thought of as the hopeful anticipation of something
which will be present. This kind of futurity is experienced as risk—an
anticipation which will take its form in another way of “addressing oneself to
the possible.” (Derrida 1997, 67)
This undecidability is the “perhaps,” the “immanence without apocalypse,”
Derrida’s “[perpetual] missing [of] his appointment with Ulysses.” The “perhaps” is the
“anxiety of a double, simultaneous, and contradictory desire, the desire to return home,
to my place, as quickly as possible, but also to adjourn the return indefinitely” (Derrida
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and Malabou 2004, 3). However, in being adestinerrant, the traveler with this “perhaps,”
remaining within the strictest tension between the paradoxical desires, carries with it the
neutralization of these two desires, in the place where one is always already. Because of
this faith in the perhaps, Derrida reiterates his neologisms—the trace, spectrality, cinders.
Deconstruction thus counters metaphysics with a hauntology, defining experience as
“evok[ing] a space that is not given in advance but that opens as it advances.” Put in
another way, “one always begins again, one is always beginning” (Gall 1994, 174), and
one is always already beginning with loss and delay, traces of presences (in this context,
origins and ends, as well as identities) that never were whole. This echoes at least three
things: first, the impossibility of justifying one’s point of origin and of departure
absolutely; and, hence, second, the inhabitation of an always already, implicative of
what one seeks to overthrow outside this habitation, in one’s desire to reappropriate
into propriety, as in the relegation of chance to accident, thus to a necessity instituted—
all movements of a traversal wanting to be an Odyssey; and three, one can thus understand
why Derrida, in the course of the preceding demonstrations, does not confront
metaphysics head-on, that is, he does not contradict every system (and the oppositions
thereof; he does not contradict them as such) but traces the system, as far as possible,
so as to demonstrate the necessity of contamination and the recognition of this necessity,
which is no longer grounded on an absolute law but on being haunted by perhaps and
alterity.
CONCLUSION
To conclude this paper, we turn again to deconstruction. Because of differance,
the concept of presence is displaced threefold: in language, presence as such, simple,
can no longer be conceived, in that the signification entails a referential chain with no
transcendental signified. There is, therefore, an alterity in the very heart of presence.
Furthermore, this alterity takes the form of a detour or a delay, taken in the context of the
now which is exposed to have traces of traces of past and future elements, indeed, for
any definition of it to be possible. Thus, differance fissures presence beforehand, as it
were—in making explicit the representation contaminating the very “origin,” which is
no longer pure or recoverable with the sign. In communication, presence instituted as
the homogenized space traversed by meaning, which itself was held to be proper, by the
same token, fissured, in that inscription always carries in itself iterability as its necessary
condition—thus, meaning is disseminated. This traversal of meaning is assured of no
ends, cannot be assured of no ends, indeed, for textuality is itself only insofar as it
functions even in the context of absence. Thus, apart from dissemination splitting the
concept of proper meaning, there also is destinerrance, which is intimately linked with
the treatment of arrival conditioned by the impossibility of advent.
Lastly, in the context of experience as traversal, this destinerrance conditions
every traverse—such that sedentariness and destination are denied in any voyage,
which Derrida insists is not a call for a somber view of experience. Instead, it can be
read as a radical openness to an alterity, an openness that does not spring from a pure,
proper identity or presence in terms of being a traveler or a space, but an alterity which
is an always already constitutive of traces of difference—as such, it is a traversal that
is “truly open to the world,” and truly open to the undecidability of perhaps.
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Insofar as philosophy is a desire for a kingdom, differance frustrates it. It
is not, thereby, falsified—it is not, for example that Plato or Hegel were
wrong—it is that the desire to dominate the field it surveys…is frustrated—
and was so before deconstruction analysed it as such. (Ferrel 1993, 130)
This is the Scylla and Charybdis of Derrida’s project: contradiction and
diversity. Or we might even say that Derrida’s Scylla and Charybdis are the
infinite and the indefinite. (Lawlor 1998, 189)
As numerous scholars did not fail to notice, Derrida’s (see Chapman and Routledge
2005, 67) massive deconstructive corpus leads his readers to either to treat him as a
passing fad or as a charlatan, or to the uncomfortable position of attempting to correct
errors with tools derived from that very error, as Barbara Johnson (1981a, x), in the
introduction to Dissemination states. However, although
...[t]he reader who follows Derrida through [the] maze of textual involutions
bears witness to an ingeniously paradoxical rhetorical strategy calculated
precisely to defy calculation. Derrida’s resistance to metaphysics is embodied
in this steadfast refusal to be captured by any calculus, caught in the noose
of the theoreticist’s dream of perfect systematicity. But such a refusal
presents profound problems for an exegete…. Derrida’s continued
deconstruction of metaphysical presuppositions…lead him once again along
a precarious path between the theoreticist edifice of metaphysics and an
9
abyss of meaninglessness…
It would suffice to say that regardless, and more importantly, because of the
grandiosity of Derrida’s efforts, what he reminds us of is quite simple: “One cannot
help wishing to master absence and yet we must always let go” (Derrida 1976, 142).
Philosophy is not immune to this desire to master presence, but it is in the constant
questioning of its own foundations that the philosophy of Derrida is at its most
relevant.
NOTES
1. A discussion of how to formally and technically deconstruct is difficult to make
explicit, as Derrida says in numerous statements, using various interrelated arguments,
for instance, in Derrida’s (1991, 273) letter to a Japanese friend: “...deconstruction is
neither an analysis nor a critique. I would say the same about method. Deconstruction
is not a method and cannot be transformed into one,” and in an interview with Derrida
(1996, 218): “…deconstruction does not consist in a set of theorems, axioms, tools,
rules, techniques, methods….” To go around this difficulty the article attempted an
ostensive discussion rather than a formulaic one.
2. “Now from the moment that once considers the totality of determined signs,
spoken, and a fortiori written, as unmotivated institutions, one must exclude any
relationship of natural subordination, any natural hierarchy among signifiers or orders
of signifiers” (Derrida 1976, 44-45). Also, from the same work (1976, 43), “[w]riting is not
a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all signs…”
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3. Oiginally, in Edmund Husserl, L’origine de la geometrie, translated and analyzed
by Derrida (1973b).
4. Derrida (1982b, 8) exploits the polysemia in the Latin and the French, aside from
that in the latter as the homonyms (differents in the sense of “different things,” differends
as “different opinions”). Differance in French does not occur in the active sense of
delaying or active differentiation from other things—it is suspended between the two
senses of differant as differing and deferring.
5. The analysis of Derrida regarding “the dangerous supplement” as supplement
(or substitute, in the sense of the French suppleance) is based on (and, hence, inscribed)
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s [1712-1778] major works, which include Reveries du
promeneur solitaire (1782), Emile (1762) as well as in Essay on the origin of languages
(ca. 1770).
6. Derrida (and Malabou 2004, 128) translated Envoi from the meanings of the
Heideggerian schicken, that is, both “to destine” and “to send.” “Envois” thus become
“sendings,” both in the contexts of communication and of travel, in that envoi
communicates a movement (either of a letter or a person, in general), subjected through
the postal system (and the implications thereof).
7. Absence is to be understood in the context of the Derridean analysis as the
absence of, following Husserl, the referent as well as the absence of either the speaker
or the scriptor; as well as of the addressee (in terms of not being present, or their
death):
What is here called “death” is the generic name we shall give to my
absence in general with respect to what I write—whether this absence be
real or an absence of attention or intention or sincerity or conviction….
When you read me, not only do you not know whether or not I am dead,
but whether what I write is really what I meant, fully compos mentis, at the
moment of writing. That there be this fundamental and irreducible
uncertainty is part of the essential structure of writing. (Bennington and
Derrida 1993, 51)
Taking this further, David Wood (1987, 148) states, “[i]t is the absence of the
Other, perhaps even the Other’s absolute absence, that is the necessary condition for
the legibility of writing.”
8. Indeed, the metaphor has been relegated as secondary to the concept, following
the binary oppositions in the logocentric metaphysics. This, Derrida (1976, 271)
claims, is what allows that the quest for the proper name, i.e., the selfsame, literal, is
the effacement of the metaphor, even the metaphoricity of language, which he equates
with the sign, through transport or transference (through the mediation of signification).
“In what consists the precision and exactitude of language, that lodging of writing?
Above all in literalness. A precise and exact language should be absolutely univocal
and literal [propre]: nonmetaphorical.” He further describes this effacement as well
as expatriation of the metaphor as characteristic of the orbital, hierarchized teleology
of the history of the logocentric metaphysics: the derivation [French deriver, from the
Latin rivus, stream; or ripa, bank] of a presence, marking it as origin and end (see
Derrida and Malabou 2004, 11). Thus, one can say that the history of metaphysics is
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the derivation (also: genealogy, order of sense) as effacement of the metaphor. Hence
the relevance of the postal principle, in this context, for, as Smith (2005, 60) astutely
observes, “[e]ven philosophical ‘concepts’ are, at bottom, post cards.”
9. Iain Thomson (1999, 20, 39) is particularly referring to the Derridean analysis of
the existential analytic of Heidegger’s Dasein and how Derrida would proffer the aporia
in connection to this, as presented by Derrida (1993) in Aporias. However, this
description of Derrida’s style is in no way limited to the aforementioned book, as most
authors and scholars of Derrida would show. See, for example, Derrida and Malabou
(2004, 10, 14) and Johnson’s introduction to Dissemination (1981a, xvi-xix).
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